The Media Line: What Are Riyadh’s Options To Invade Yemen?

What Are Riyadh’s Options To Invade Yemen?

Riyadh does not seek a “complete conquest of Houthi territory, but to change the military balance sufficiently to force the Houthis to halt attacks on Saudi territory and shipping,” Cyril Widdershoven, a geopolitical analyst, told TML

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line

Reports that Saudi Arabia may be preparing a military operation against Yemen’s Houthis have revived fears that Riyadh could be drawn back into a direct ground war. But the evidence currently points to contingency planning and force repositioning—not a confirmed Saudi ground invasion.

Public reporting has described Saudi troop movements in eastern Yemen, discussions over a possible operation in or towards the central governorate of Al-Bayda, and efforts to assemble a multinational maritime coalition. Saudi Arabia, however, has not publicly announced a ground offensive, and the reported movements do not by themselves establish that a final political or operational order has been issued.

The speculation follows the collapse of the relative calm that had prevailed along the Saudi-Yemeni border. On July 13, the Houthis fired missiles towards southern Saudi Arabia after accusing Riyadh of striking Sanaa airport, ending approximately four years without comparable cross-border exchanges. On July 20, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, and days later claimed attacks against Saudi oil tankers and energy infrastructure.

The pressure is particularly sensitive because the Red Sea has become increasingly important for Saudi energy exports as the war between the United States and Iran continues to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping around Bab el-Mandeb therefore exposes Saudi Arabia to pressure at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi officials have responded with airstrikes against Houthi targets and the establishment of a 14-nation maritime defense coalition involving countries including Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen and Turkey.

Yet a new Saudi campaign would not necessarily resemble the intervention launched in 2015.

Cyril Widdershoven, a senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, told The Media Line that as of Aug. 2, 2026 there was no conclusive evidence that Saudi regular forces had already entered Houthi-controlled Yemen in significant numbers or begun a major ground invasion.

He said that the increasingly credible indicators of Riyadh’s preparation of military options could include possibly a limited land campaign, which most probably would be led by Yemeni anti-Houthi forces with Saudi air, intelligence, logistics, and command support.

The central distinction is between a Saudi invasion and an offensive conducted by Yemeni forces with Saudi support. Analysts say Riyadh appears to have little appetite for sending large, armored formations deep into northern Yemen, where the geography, extended supply lines and the Houthis’ experience in irregular warfare would expose Saudi forces to significant losses.

Instead, any operation might rely on units aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, particularly forces positioned around Marib, Hadramaut and the Saudi border. Saudi Arabia could contribute air power, intelligence, artillery, engineering capabilities, air defense, logistics and command assistance.

“It will not be a Saudi invasion resembling the 2015 intervention,” Widdershoven said. “Most plausibly it would be a Saudi-enabled Yemeni offensive, possibly supported by small numbers of Saudi personnel in command, intelligence, artillery, air-defense, engineering, and special-forces roles.”

Several possible axes have emerged. An operation through Al-Bayda could place pressure on Houthi-controlled territory from central Yemen and potentially connect government-held areas in the east and south with routes leading towards Sanaa.

“Based on assessments, a central-axis campaign could attempt to pressure the Houthis through Al-Bayda, thereby connecting anti-Houthi areas in southern and eastern Yemen to the approaches to Sanaa,” Widdershoven said. “In reality, Al-Bayda is strategically valuable because it lies at the center of several major Yemeni regions and could threaten Houthi internal lines of communication,” he explained, adding that for the military, it would be a difficult operation due to its mountainous terrain, tribal complexity, and narrow roads, all favoring defenders.

A second scenario would involve renewed pressure from Marib, where government-aligned forces already confront established Houthi defensive positions. A third could focus on the Red Sea coast, potentially extending from Mokha and Al-Khawkhah towards Hodeidah. In theory, such a campaign could seek to restrict Houthi access to ports, missile positions, surveillance sites and infrastructure used to threaten maritime traffic.

Saudi involvement could therefore remain largely outside the principal ground formations. According to Widdershoven’s assessment, Saudi personnel would be more likely to protect border areas, provide precision-strike and artillery support, conduct limited special-forces operations and help secure ports, airfields or logistics installations captured by Yemeni forces.

“Saudi combat aircraft and drones will be used to strike launch sites, storage facilities, command nodes, and coastal missile positions before and during any ground advance. Saudi naval forces could simultaneously tighten inspections or establish protected shipping corridors. Keep in mind, all of this will not remove or defeat the Houthis,” he noted.

The purpose of such an operation would consequently be coercive rather than territorial: to change the military balance, reduce the threat to Saudi infrastructure and shipping, and force the Houthis back towards negotiations.

“Riyadh’s objective is overall expected to be not a complete conquest of Houthi territory, but to change the military balance sufficiently to force the Houthis to halt attacks on Saudi territory and shipping,” Widdershoven said.

Abdulghani Al-Iryani, senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, where his work focuses on conflict, political transition and regional dynamics, offered a more skeptical assessment of both the likelihood of an imminent ground campaign and the capacity of Yemen’s government forces to conduct one.

“There is a lot of talk, but it is not convincing to me. I think the government forces are not prepared to carry out an offensive,” he told The Media Line.

“They can defend themselves and their positions now that they have better weapons, are better armed and are better commanded, but I do not think they have the capacity to carry out offensive action. So, despite all the rumors, I do not think there is going to be a ground war in the near future. This might change in the coming weeks, but right now, it is not likely.”

The capacity of anti-Houthi forces remains a central constraint. The forces include formations with different chains of command, regional constituencies, political objectives and foreign sponsors. Even with Saudi air support, bringing them together under a coherent operational structure would be difficult. An offensive that succeeds initially but then stalls could leave Riyadh facing an extended conflict without achieving sufficient leverage to impose a settlement.

Al-Iryani also rejected the prospect of Saudi forces leading a major ground campaign.

“Saudi Arabia will not send its forces. I think the Saudi plan is to get the Yemeni government forces to carry out the ground operations while Saudi Arabia provides air support,” he said.

“I think a combination of the stick—a ground invasion by government forces supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt—and the carrot—a political deal—will eventually prevail,” Al-Iryani noted.

The references to possible Pakistani and Egyptian support describe Al-Iryani’s assessment of how a broader campaign could develop. Public commitments by Cairo and Islamabad have so far focused on the Saudi-led maritime security initiative rather than a confirmed deployment of ground forces inside Yemen.

The renewed confrontation is also no longer confined to Yemen. Saudi and regional assessments cited by Reuters alleged that some recent attacks against Saudi energy facilities were launched from Iraq through coordination between Houthi personnel and Iran-aligned Iraqi factions. The Houthis claimed responsibility themselves, while Iraq said it was investigating. Saudi Arabia and the United States subsequently struck militia positions in Iraq, widening the geographical scope of the confrontation.

That development complicates any Saudi military calculation. Even a successful campaign against missile and drone infrastructure in Yemen would not necessarily eliminate attacks conducted through Iraqi territory or other Iran-aligned networks. It also increases the danger that a Saudi-Houthi confrontation becomes inseparable from the broader exchange between Washington and Tehran.

President Donald Trump has publicly threatened to hold Iran responsible for further Houthi attacks, while the United States has continued striking Iranian targets. Tehran, in turn, has attacked or threatened American positions in neighboring Arab countries. Saudi Arabia therefore faces pressure to respond to attacks on its territory and shipping without allowing Yemen to become another uncontrolled front in the US-Iran war.

For Washington, a Yemeni ground campaign would present its own limitations. Airstrikes can degrade launch sites, storage facilities and command networks, but they cannot by themselves establish control over territory or resolve Yemen’s fragmented political order.

“The United States has no palatable military options, and elections are getting close, so I expect Trump will return to the memorandum of understanding,” Al-Iryani said.

The humanitarian consequences would be significant. Yemen is already facing severe food insecurity. In government-controlled areas alone, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projected that approximately 5.4 million people would experience crisis-level hunger or worse during the June-to-September lean season. Renewed disruption to ports, roads and commercial shipping could further increase food and fuel prices across both government- and Houthi-controlled territory.

“The Houthis cannot hold on for long because the Yemeni population under their control is starving,” Al-Iryani said. “Interfering with maritime traffic will lead to higher food prices and the onset of famine in Yemen.”

For the Houthis, maritime pressure offers leverage over Saudi Arabia, regional energy markets and Washington. But sustained disruption could also deepen economic hardship among the population they govern. For Riyadh, military action may reduce immediate pressure on shipping or the border, yet it risks reviving a war that proved costly, difficult to control and resistant to a purely military solution.

The evidence supports a cautious conclusion. Saudi Arabia appears to be preparing options, reinforcing maritime defenses, and assessing how to activate Yemeni forces against the Houthis. A limited Saudi-enabled offensive around Al-Bayda, Marib or the Red Sea coast is increasingly conceivable. A large Saudi ground invasion, however, remains less likely.

The decisive questions are whether Yemeni government forces could sustain an offensive; whether Saudi air and logistical support could compensate for their fragmentation; and whether battlefield pressure could produce a political settlement before a limited campaign became another prolonged regional war.

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